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Abstract:  Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of 
cichlid fighting fish and trace memory in goldfish do not support claims about sentience. This is 
disputed by research results about learning and implicit processing, sleep, vegetative states, 
amnesia, semantic priming, artificial network modeling, and even insects. A novel, deflationary, 
interpretation of Grosenick et al.'s experiments on A. burtoni is also offered.  
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Woodruff's (2017) assemblage of ideas and data from the neuroantaomy, physiology, and 
behavior of teleost fish is more than one short commentary can digest. Accordingly, my focus 
will be on some of the behavioral results he points to as evidence of sentience in sections 5.1 to 
5.3. 
 Grosenick et al. (2007) interpret observational learning as showing that cichlids can 
reason in the form of transitive inference (TI). Incidentally, this example has begun to attract 
notice from fish-positive philosophers such as Tye (2016, pp. 99-100), who finds it "especially 
interesting." As for what TI has to do with sentience, Woodruff argues that the connection is by 
way of declarative memory. Declarative memory differs from implicit memory in going beyond 
classical associative processes, having different anatomical dependences, especially the 
mammalian hippocampus, and, according to some, only occurring consciously (Smith and Squire 
2005). Woodruff bolsters the behavioral evidence with a comparison of structure and function 
of the hippocampus to region DL in the fish pallium. 
 Following Allen (2013), we can wonder how transportable are findings about various 
"fish," (even if teleost) to other species, even when somewhat closely related. For example, 
taking evidence of TI in cichlids at face value, does this give confidence we would find TI in 
goldfish? Does it matter? I take it that TI is just an example of how we might establish a 
plausible link to consciousness via declarative memory (i.e., explicit memory of things like facts 
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and events). So its presence is not necessary, though it is offered as one of multiple indicators 
sufficient for sentience on their own.  
 Yet there are several reasons we cannot suppose an organism is sentient just because it 
exhibits TI-style responses, starting with uncertainty about the character of the relevant 
information-processing architectures (McFarland and Bösser 1993, p. 27). Researchers and 
philosophers cannot decide between cognitive models and ones drawing only on reinforcement 
(Lazareva 2012; Allen 2006; Beck 2012, p. 226). Even assuming a cognitive model, the step from 
declarative memory to sentience needs more support in light of the apparent acquisition of 
declarative knowledge by amnesiacs and phenomena such as semantic priming: The 
representation of declarative knowledge need not be available to consciousness. In addition, 
performance on TI tasks does not depend on explicit awareness in human subjects (Frank et al. 
2005; Leo and Greene 2008).  
 Similar doubts can be raised about trace memory, such as when there is a delay (the 
trace interval) between hearing a buzzer (the conditioned stimulus, CS) and a puff of air that 
induces blinking. In goldfish, conditioning can take place when the trace interval between the CS 
and the unconditioned stimulus is almost 14 seconds (Rodríguez-Expósito et al. 2017, p. 130). 
Woodruff points us to Clark and Squire (1998, 2004) who propose that trace memory is a form 
of declarative memory requiring awareness (see also Manns et al., p. 192; Clark et al. 2002). But 
adaptive response only requires that the trace left by the CS be a memory representation. That 
it is a conscious memory representation cannot be assumed without further argument (cf. Key 
2016 on Bowers 2016). Trace conditioning is known to occur in insects (Carew et al. 1983; Dylla 
et al. 2013), leading some to worry that it cannot be trusted to reveal covert consciousness in 
seemingly vegetative patients (Bekinschtein et al. 2009, p. 1348). Two other areas suggestive of 
trace conditioning in the absence of awareness are sleep research (Arzi et al. 2012; Nakano et al. 
2008) and implicit fear conditioning (Morris et al., 1998). The trace interval paradigm has also 
been applied to computational models of firing dynamics consisting of only 8,000 cells (Thomas 
and Levy 2014).  
 While others could point to additional evidence about goldfish, including avoidance 
learning, tradeoffs, and sensitivity to opioids (Sneddon et al. 2014), once again deflationary 
explanations are not ruled out — morphine also inhibits non-conscious nociception, for example 
(Rose 2002). More could be said, but because several of these points will be familiar to many, I 
will close with something new about the cichlid fighting fish (Astatotilapia burtoni) under 
contention.  
 Beyond the possibility of implicit processing, we can stop to question the assumption 
that the cichlids' responses were driven by observations of social rank. What if instead of 
thinking logically about relative status, there is just some cue typical of fiercer fighters (perhaps 
size, coloration, or what-have-you)? Could the difference between the Mike Tysons and A. J. 
Ayers1 be manifest in some perceptible difference in morphology that the researchers did not 
notice?   
 This is not idle hypothesis mongering. The fish were bred under naturalistic conditions, 
including that the males were permitted to "establish and maintain territories" separated only 
by traversable obstructions, such as pieces of terracotta (Grosenick et al. 2007, Supplemental 
                                                        
1 http://www.nytimes.com/books/00/12/24/reviews/001224.24spurlit.html?mcubz=0  
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Materials, p. 1). I took this to imply that they had many opportunities for interaction, including 
combat, prior to their use in the study. After all, the outcomes of matches staged on behalf of 
bystanders were preplanned, so the researchers must have known the relative prowess of 
individuals. This might matter because, as Grosenick et al. note (2007, p. 429), losing induces a 
physiological effect whereby the male's bright coloration gradually dulls.2 So might this fading of 
brilliance correlated with lesser fighting ability be something the fish are sensitive to? The 
various checks made of their training procedure (see their Supplementary Material) do not rule 
this out (color is not mentioned at all, save for the brief acknowledgement just mentioned). 
Since this alternative hypothesis has some antecedent plausibility, what we really need to know 
is whether an untrained bystander would have chosen Ayer over Tyson anyway, and whether 
they would generally tend to avoid the more brightly colored of two potential rivals. Likewise, 
would trained bystanders ignore fighting prowess and respond to coloration if these were 
uncorrelated?  In the absence of data on these matters, it is premature to draw any conclusions 
whatsoever about the inferential capacities of A. burtoni. This is but one example of the 
preference of scholars and audiences for exciting research results over metaphorical buckets of 
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